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We propose applications of sample pooling for RT-qPCR diagnostic to the epidemiologic study of
COVID-19. Taking into account the false negatives created by the dilution of individual samples,
our arguments indicate that group testing allows for precise estimates of the prevalence of the disease
in the population and early detection of epidemic outbreak in connected communities while saving
tests for further massive testing of the population.
Regularly monitoring the prevalence of the contamina-
tion, i.e. the proportion of contagious individuals within
the general population at a given time, is a key element
to prevent the onset of an epidemic wave, to estimate
the effect of social distancing policies and to anticipate a
potential increase in the demand for intensive care units
hospitalization [1].
Contagious individuals are generally assumed to bear
a viral load in their respiratory tract [2]. Such viral load
can be detected within swab samples using a technique
called reverse transcription quantitative polymerase chain
reaction (RT-qPCR) [3]. With tests performed in prior-
ity on symptomatic patients, the measured prevalence
among the tested population is larger than the global
prevalence, i.e. defined among the whole population. In
principle, a modelling approach could provide estimates
for the global prevalence in contagious viral carriers based
on the statistics in the number of symptomatic individu-
als; however, such modeling is particularly challenging in
the context of the COVID19 epidemics, given (a) the cur-
rent large uncertainty regarding the proportion of asymp-
tomatic carriers (estimated to be in 20−50% range [4–7])
and (b) the delay between the onset of contagiosity and
first symptoms, which varies from 1 to 5 days [8, 9].
Testing large portions of the population, including
asymptomatic individuals, would allow for a direct mea-
sure of the global prevalence. Unfortunately, the reac-
tants of RT-qPCR diagnostic tests are a tight resource
and test production would not meet the demand of such
large-scale population diagnostic [10].
In such context of a global shortage in diagnostic tests,
group testing has received a regain in interest. The prin-
ciple of group testing consists in combining samples from
multiple individuals into a single pool that is then tested
using a single test-kit. The pool sample is to be positive
if and only if at least one individual in the group is con-
taminated. The idea of group testing is not new, with a
long history that dates back to 1943 [11] in the context
of syphilis detection (see [12] for a review). Optimal di-
agnostic strategies include smart-pooling, whereby pools
are organised according to lines and columns on a grid
–or hypercube– with overlaps enabling the identification
of positive individuals [13–15].
Several teams across the world have achieved group
testing protocols on SARS-COV2 infected individuals us-
ing RT-qPCR tests. As early as February 2020, pools of
10 have been used over 2740 patients to detect 2 positive
patients over the San Francisco Bay in California [16]. A
recent publication from Germany has shown that posi-
tive patients with relatively mild viral load can still be
detected within pools of 30 [17]. Further works suggest
that RT-qPCR viral detection can been achieved in pools
ranging from 5 to 64 [18–20].
In parallel, the theoretical literature on group testing
for SARS-COV-2 diagnostic is growing at a fast pace [10,
21, 22]. Most of the emphasis has been put on the binary
(positive or negative) outcome of tests, with little or no
regard on the viral load measure [3]. Moreover, if the
possibility of false negatives is sometimes considered, it
is rarely taken into account that the false negative rate
increases with the dilution of samples appearing in group
testing [15].
In this communication, we do not address any diag-
nostic problems, such as the question of determining op-
timal strategies to provide individual positive diagnostic
to a large population using a minimal number of tests.
Rather, we propose to evaluate pooling strategies for epi-
demiology purposes. In particular, we focus on the mea-
sure of the prevalence; we include a realistic model of
RT-qPCR diagnostic tests in which we take into account
the increased proportion of false negatives with larger
pool sizes [25].
The rest of the article is divided into 4 parts. First,
we present a simple protocol for the measurement of the
prevalence in a population using group tests under the
assumption of perfect tests, i.e. not subject to false neg-
atives and dilution; the simplicity of this model allows
us to present the main ideas behind our computations.
Second, we provide a short description of the RT-qPCR
test and propose a statistical model for its study. Then,
we fit the parameters of this model by proposing a proce-
dure to analyse the viral charge in patients as measured
by RT-qPCR tests; our analysis is currently based on a
simulated dataset that has similar statistical features as
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2the clinical dateset of Ref. [23]; our objective here is to
provide a method to estimate the risk of false negative
caused by the pooling dilution effect. Finally, we show
how, using this statistical model, one can measure the
viral prevalence in the population (as introduced in the
first section) and design protocols to prevent an epidemic
outbreak to spread within closed vulnerable communities
(e.g. retirement homes, detention centres).
I. MEASURING PREVALENCE WITH
PERFECT TESTS
As discussed above, we investigate in this section the
measurement of the prevalence of the disease in a popula-
tion using a group testing strategy, under the assumption
of perfect tests, i.e. with no risks of false negative.
We assume that we dispose of n tests and pools con-
taining samples from N individuals. We denote by p
the (unknown) proportion of contaminated individuals
in the population. Write (X(N)i , i ≤ n) the results of
these tests, with X(N)i = 1 if the ith test is positive, 0
otherwise. Then, these are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables with pa-
rameter 1− (1− p)N .
Lemma I.1. Writing X(N)n = 1n
∑N
j=1X
(N)
j , the quan-
tity 1−(1−X(N)n )1/N is a strongly consistent and asymp-
totically normal estimator of p. A confidence interval of
asymptotic level 1− α is
CI1−α(p) =
[
1− (1−X(N)n )1/N
±qα(1−X
(N)
n )1/N−1
√
X
(N)
n (1−X
(N)
n )√
nN
 ,
(1)
where qα is the quantile of order 1−α/2 of the standard
Gaussian random variable.
Proof. Note that (X(N)j , j ≤ n) is a standard Bernoulli
model, hence X(N)n is a consistent and asymptotically
normal estimator of f(p) = 1 − (1 − p)N . Hence, using
that f−1 is C1 and Slutsky’s lemma, we deduce all the
above properties of the estimator f−1(X(N)n ) of p.
Remark I.2. In particular, observe that for any N ∈ N,
the width of the confidence interval has for almost sure
equivalent
2qα√
n
(1− p)
N
√
1− (1− p)N
(1− p)N . (2)
We plot in Fig. 1, for some small values of p, the total
number of tests n needed so that the above quantity goes
below a fixed value, as a function of N . We also plot nN
the total number of tests needed in these settings.
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Figure 1: (a,b) Total number of tests and total number of
sampled individuals in order to precisely estimate a theoret-
ical prevalence at p = 3% with a ±0.2% precision at a 95%
confidence interval as a function of the pool size N for (dashed
lines) the perfect case (with no false negative) considered in
Sec. I and (solid lines) the more realistic case considered in
Sec. IV (with false positive; parameters are defined in Ta-
ble II). In (a) N ranges from 0 to 25; in (b) N ranges from
0 to 128; as visible in (b), the plateau around the optimal
pool size Nopt ≈ 50 is large: near optimal savings in tests are
achieved even for moderately large pool sizes, e.g. N = 10.
A classical calculation shows that Eq. (2) is minimal
for an optimal value of the individuals in the pool:
Nopt = − c?log(1− p) ⇐⇒ (1− p)
Nopt ≈ 0.20, (3)
where c? = 2 +W (−2e−2) ≈ 1.59 and W is the Lambert
W function [10]. For N = Nopt, obtaining the target
width takes significantly less testing that assuming single
testing of individuals at random, but the total number
of individuals needed to be tested is rather high, and if
testing has a cost, so is sampling individuals. On the
other hands, the well of the function graphed in Fig. 1 is
rather wide, so a wide number of quasi-optimal choices
for N can be taken with similar precision.
II. STATISTICAL MODELLING OF THE PCR
The RT-qPCR technique has been extensively used to
estimate the concentration in viral material in samples
[24]. We briefly sketch the main steps of a RT-qPCR di-
agnostic protocol in Box 1. The PCR typically returns
a Ct value, which corresponds to − log2 of the initial
number of DNA copies in the sample, up to an additive
constant and measure error. It is measured as an esti-
mated number of cycles needed for the intensity to reach
a value that is larger than a target value (see Fig. 2).
PCR tests are prone to non-specific DNA amplifica-
tion sequence [24, 25], which can make negative samples
(whereby there viral contamination is absent) showing up
positive after a certain number of cycles; such false posi-
tive typically occur after a critical number of cycles which
we denoted dcens (detection threshold), with is usually in
the 37 to 40 range. We refer to these false positive out-
comes within negative samples (whereby the virus should
3Box 1: Description of PCR tests
We review some of the steps implemented during a RT-
qPCR diagnostic procedure:
1. The patient sample is treated; if present, a target vi-
ral RNA sequence is transcribed into DNA (reverse
transcription);
2. The sample is placed in a PCR machine, which can
measure the concentration of DNA of interest in the
sample, which is characteristic of the virus;
3. A reactive is added which approximatively doubles the
number of DNA of interest at every cycle;
4. The time series of the concentration in DNA over time
is registered; by linear regression of the logarithm of
the concentration over time, one deduces the viral con-
centration at the origin.
Combined measure of two viral RNA strands with a con-
trol of a human RNA strand are recommended in order
to detect defective sampling that could induce false neg-
atives, but also to improve precision of the measure as
well as to normalize the number of virus copies by the
quantity of human DNA [3]. We point out that the effect
of reverse transcription could also induce a measurement
error on the real viral concentration in the sample, which
we do intend to model here.
be totally absent) as artefacts [25] that we model as if
triggered by a vanishingly small artificial viral concen-
tration, denoted 1.
We propose to model for the number of cycle threshold
value Ct as random variable, denoted Y , that depends on
the sample viral load, denoted c, as
Y = − log2 (c+ 1) + 2, (4)
where 1 is the law of the artefact, modelled as a log-
normal distribution with parameters (ν, τ2); 2 is an in-
trinsic measurement error on the threshold value Ct mea-
surement, modelled as a centred Gaussian random vari-
able with variance ρ2. In the idealized no false positive
artefact limit (1 → 0), the PCR threshold intensity of a
negative patient (c = 0) is never reached (Y →∞).
Tests are considered to reliably positive when the num-
ber of amplification cycles is below dcens, i.e. To avoid
false positive, the threshold dcens is chosen such that
P(1 > 2−dcens). Thus, using that as long as a and b are
of different orders of magnitude, we have log(a + b) ≈
log(max(a, b)), we deduce that
Y (c) ≈ max(− log2(c), dcens) + 2, (5)
which obeys the law of a Gaussian random variable with
variance ρ2 and mean − log2(c), censored at dcens.
We now consider what happens when constructing a
pooled sample of N individuals. For each i ≤ N , we
write zi = 1 if i is contaminated, zi = 0 otherwise, and
Ci for the concentration in viral RNA of each sample. A
combined sample is created from an homogeneous mixing
of the individual samples, the viral concentration then
becomes 1N
∑
ziCi (at least under the assumption of a
reasonably high number of viral copies per sample). The
result of the RT-qPCR measure of a grouped test with
N individual then reads
Y (N) = max
log2N − log2
 N∑
j=1
zjCj
 , dcens
+ 2.
(6)
where (zi, i ≤ N) are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables
whose parameter is the prevalence of the disease in that
population; (Ci, i ≤ N) are i.i.d. random variables cor-
responding to the law of the viral concentration within
samples taken from random individuals among the over-
all population.
In order to determine the statistics of the group test
cycle Y (N), we need a model for the statistics of Cj , the
viral distribution of individuals in the overall population;
this is the objective of the next section.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIRAL
LOAD MEASURED IN POSITIVE SAMPLES
In this section, we estimate the distribution of the viral
load in patients of SARS-COV-2, using the histogram
presented in Fig. 1 in [23] built upon a large sample of
3712 positive patients. As the precise distribution of data
points is unknown within each class of the histogram, we
assumed that points were distributed uniformly within
them.
In the SI Appendix B 1, we propose an estimation by
mixing models which is biased from the censorship al-
ready explained above. We now suggest several ways to
estimate the density of the Ct value measured by RT-
qPCR among infected individuals.
A. Censored model and partially censored model
In this section, we present the model in the case of a
single component censored to the left of a threshold dcens.
The experience is as follows:
1. We simulate X following a Gaussian law N (µ, σ).
2. If X < dcens, we return X; otherwise, we simulate
Z following a Bernoulli law B(p) with p ∈ [0; 1[ and
if Y Z = 1, we return X else we repeat the step 1.
We call this model a partially censored Gaussian model
denoted CN dcens(µ, σ, p). If we denote by fµ,σ (resp.
Fµ,σ) the density (resp. the cumulative distribution func-
tion) of a Gaussian law N (µ, σ) then the density of X is
defined for every x ∈ R by:
fX(x) =
fµ,σ(x)
p+ (1− p)Fµ,σ(dcens) ×
{
1 if x < dcens,
p else. (7)
40.
00
0.
04
0.
08
0
26 = 64
+ N = 1 
lim
it 
of
 d
et
ec
tio
n 
 
a
b
thresholdI
nt
en
sit
y
Number of PCR amplification cycles
+ N = 64 
- Negative
+ N = 1 
+ N = 64 
D
ist
rib
ut
io
n
C
C
Number of PCR amplification cycles
(Simulations)
c
D
ist
rib
ut
io
n
C
lim
it 
of
 d
et
ec
tio
n 
 
lim
it 
of
 d
et
ec
tio
n 
 
10 15 20 25 30 35
10 15 20 25 30 35
10 15 20 25 30 35
Figure 2: (a) Sketch of a RT-qPCR fluorescence intensity
signal for (sold red line) a positive patient without pooling
(dashed red curve) a single positive patient in a pool of 64
patients (which is expected close to that obtained by trans-
lating x→ x+6 from that of a single patient) (dotted magenta
curve) for a negative patient (identified as a false positive)(b)
Distribution of threshold values for (solid blue line) a stan-
dard PCR, without pooling, modelled as a Gaussian mixture
(see Sec. III), and (dashed red curve) within a grouped RT-
qPCR tests; part of the distribution is censored beyond a
limit of detection threshold value at Y ≈ dcens = 35.6 cy-
cles (magenta vertical line) beyond which false positive can
appear. (c) Representation of the density for the censored
model (fill lines) and partially censored model (dashed) with
three components: the orange/green/red lines represent the
density of each component and the blue line the density of
the mixture. The purple vertical line corresponds to the loca-
tion of the threshold dcens ≈ 35.6; only the partially censored
distribution uses the information in the bars to the right of
this line.
.
Remark III.1. In the absence of censorship (i.e. in the
limits p → 1 or dcens → +∞), we check that Eq. (7)
converges to a Gaussian density distribution.
In this model, we assume that all values after the
threshold dcens have the same probability p to appear;
this can be in contradiction with the origin of the cen-
sorship exposed previously. We could imagine another
law which would allow values close to dcens to appear
more often than those which are far away but the ques-
tion would then be the choice of this law.
Another solution, which we will study here, is to forget
the values after the threshold and to suppose that we
have a completely censored law (ie p = 0) which we will
denote CN dcens(µ, σ) = CN dcens(µ, σ, 0) with the density
defined for every x ∈ R by:
fX(x) =
fµ,σ(x)
Fµ,σ(dcens)
1{x≤dcens} (8)
where 1{x≤dcens} is the indicator function equal to 1 if
x ≤ dcens, and 0 otherwise.
Due to the presence of the cumulative distribution
function of a Gaussian law in the denominator in the nor-
malization constant, it is not possible to obtain analytical
forms of the parameter estimators. Nevertheless, the log
likelihood is regular and we can estimate the parameters
using an optimization algorithm like the R function nlm
which implements a Newton-type algorithm.
To study the quality of the estimations, we simulated
104 sample of size n ∈ {102, 103, 104, 105} following the
model CN dcens (0, 1, p) with dcens ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3}
and p ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. We provide boxplots estima-
tions of the parameters in Fig. S4 and a zoom on signifi-
cant part in Fig. S5.
The first observation is that the estimates are gener-
ally close to the estimated value but we can sometimes
have very large deviations. We find that the more n in-
creases, the better the estimate. The threshold seems to
have a weak influence on the estimation of the partially
censored model but, for the fully censored model, we see
that the more dcens increases and the more the quality of
the estimates increases; especially when dcens = −2 which
represents approximately the 2.3% quantile. Given the
large deviations that we sometimes have, it would be in-
teresting to study if these deviations correspond to a real
theoretical problem or if these hint at a need for a better
optimization algorithm.
B. Censored mixture model
Finally, we apply the previous censored models to the
data simulated based on the values for the viral load dis-
tribution found in [23] with a mixture model and with a
threshold dcens ≈ 35.6 (so the last two bars are supposed
to be censored.). We assume that the threshold is the
same for each component. In Fig. 2(c), we represent the
histogram with the density for the mixture.
We observe that densities are very close and the last
component has a larger variance than that estimated by
the mixture model of the section B 1. To a lesser ex-
tent, the second component also extends a little further
to the left of the threshold. Finally, the density of the
5mixing model seems to better estimate the peaks of the
histograms (the table III give the estimated parameters).
For the partial censored model, the Bernoulli parameter
is close to 0.2 for each component; it seems that there is
a loss of 80%.
To compare the importance of the threshold, we dis-
play in Fig. S6 the censored mixture estimation with
dcens ≈ 33.2 and dcens ≈ 34.4. For the partial censored
model, the procedure did not converge; the proportions
of the bars therefore seem different and we should think
about another law. So we only present for the totally cen-
sored model. We observe that the first and second com-
ponents are globally unchanged. The means and stan-
dard deviations of the last component are almost the
same for dcens ≈ 34.4 and dcens ≈ 35.6 (see table IV);
only the proportions naturally decrease with the thresh-
old. On the other hand, the mean moves slightly to the
left for dcens ≈ 33.2; this is due to the fact that we lose
the information of the largest bars of this component. It
might also be caused by our ignorance of the exact dis-
tribution of Ct values within classes of the histogram (we
assume that it is an uniform distribution).
Remark III.2. The fact that the viral load is widely
distributed further justifies the assumption leading to
Eq. (5).
The current analysis is consistent with a qualitative
analysis of two other datasets [19, 26], whereby we typ-
ically find that the law of C can be modelled as a log-
normal distribution with a standard deviation σ in the 5
to 6 range.
IV. GROUP TESTING: APPLICATION TO
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
We now show how the previous analysis of the tests
used to detect COVID-19 can be used to precise the epi-
demiological monitoring of the disease in the general pop-
ulation.
A. Pooled sample viral concentration cannot be
used to infer the precise number of infected
individual
Here we show that the measured value of the pooled
sample viral concentration cannot be used to estimate
the number of infected individual within the pool. In the
previous section, we found that the viral concentration
in randomly selected infected individuals spans several
order of magnitudes. Therefore, the PCR test will typi-
cally only return the concentration of the largest sample,
with a drift of log2(N) (cf. Figure 2), using the approx-
imation log2( 1N
∑
aj) ≈ log2(max aj) − log2(N). As a
result, the measure from that test does not allow to de-
tect the number of contaminated individuals in a sample,
which would have been possible otherwise in the context
of a more narrower distribution (e.g. for Gaussian dis-
tributed) in the viral charge [35].
B. Group testing and the measure of viral
prevalence
Here, in contrast to Sec. I, we no longer consider
that the PCR test used to detect viral charge is per-
fect. Instead we used the censored group model defined
in Eq. (6). With this model, it appears that increasing
the value of N the size of the pool not only has the ef-
fect to increase the probability that one member of the
group is contaminated, but also to decrease the smallest
concentration that can be detected within samples from
an infectious individual.
In these settings, we assume the prevalence in the
population to be small, so that with high probability,
a small number of contaminated individuals can appear
in a group. Additionally, using the fact that the viral
concentration is distributed on several orders of magni-
tudes and that the sample will return positive only if
the average concentration is larger than dcens, a group of
N individuals will be detected as contaminated (up to a
small error) if and only if at least one individual in the
group has a viral charge larger than N2−dcens .
As we have an epidemiologic aim in mind, the appari-
tion of additional false negatives should not be treated
as disqualifying. However, this means that increasing the
value of N the size of the group has the effect of decreas-
ing the value of pΦ(d(N)cens), with d(N)cens = dcens − log2(N)
and Φ the cumulative distribution function of − log2(C)
(we neglect here for simplicity the measurement error of
the PCR, but the formula would work exactly the same
with this additional element). Note that pΦ(zN ) is in
fact the quantity measured by the estimator described in
Table I: Table of the pool size as function of the number of
tests for a prevalence of 3% measured at a 2.10−3 precision
with a 95% confidence interval, for both the perfect test (with
no false negatives, see Sec. I) and imperfect tests (with false
negatives; model parameters defined in Table II)
Pool Perfect tests Imperfect tests
size N Number of
tests n
Sample size
nN
Number of
tests n
Sample size
nN
1 29100 29100 29464 29464
2 14775 29550 15069 30138
3 10003 30009 10261 30783
5 6191 30955 6411 32055
10 3350 33500 3530 35300
20 1973 39460 2130 42600
30 1561 46830 1716 51480
50 1349 67450 1525 76250
100 1884 188400 2235 223500
200 10378 2075600 13105 2621000
6Box 2: A protocol of prevalence determination
We propose the following procedure for the measure of
prevalence via group testing:
1. Start from an a priori estimate for the prevalence, de-
noted pˆ0.
2. Based on the value of pˆ0, estimate the number N of
individuals in the pool that minimizes the total num-
ber of tests needed to achieve the estimation of the
prevalence p at the targeted precision and confidence
interval
3. Construct a number of n pools containing each N indi-
viduals selected at random in the general population.
4. Count the number of positive tests and compute the
average X(N)n .
5. An improved estimate of the prevalence then reads:
pˆ1 = 1− (1−X(N)n )1/N .
Note that this method can easily be adapted into a
Bayesian algorithm, with the number N of individuals
tested modified at each iteration of the procedure.
Sec. I with the current model. As a result, the estimator
of p, and its confidence interval, has to be modified into
CI1−α(p) =
[
1− (1−X(N)n )1/N
Φ(zN )
± qα√
n
(1−X(N)n )1/N−1
√
X
(N)
n (1−X
(N)
n )
NΦ(zN )
 .
(9)
We assume here that C is distributed according to the
distribution Eq. (8) obtained in the previous section. As
expected, due to false negatives we find that the number
of tests needed to reach a given precision on the preva-
lence is increased (see Fig. 1 and Table I). We the optimal
value of N to choose become smaller than Nopt, in par-
ticular in low prevalence settings.
Assuming a prevalence of p = 3%, and setting up a
target 95% confidence interval of width 0.4%, standard
testing of individuals would require around 30 000 tests.
On the other hand, taking N = 50 would be optimal
in the sense of Eq. (3), which would divided the needed
number of tests by 20. But it would at the same time
increase the number of individuals needed to be sampled
by 2.5, whereas choosing N = 20 already divide by 14
the number of tests needed, only increasing by 40% the
size of the sample. We summarize our results in Table I.
In the current COVID19 context, we expect the overall
prevalence within populations of asymptomatic individ-
uals to be lower than 1%. Precise estimates performed
in Iceland indicated a prevalence at 0.8% of the overall
population [28].
We have checked that using simpler log-normal distri-
butions for the viral load with similar mean and variance
instead of Eq. (8) leads to qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 3: (a) Width of the 95% credible interval on the
prevalance p with adaptative Bayesian sampling as a func-
tion of the number of tests n as compared with single pooling
methods. (b) Bayesian of the credible interval in the preva-
lence for two-category mixed population: (magenta solid line)
in the general population (blue dashed line) for the less ex-
posed population 1 (80% of the general population with a
prevalence of 0.5%); (red dotted line) for more at-risk popu-
lation 2 (20% of the general population with a prevalence of
5%).
C. Group testing and Bayesian inference of the
prevalence in sub-categories of the population
Note that the above algorithm can be adapted to
study different prevalences in specific sub-populations,
provided that the number of individuals of each subpop-
ulation is known for every grouped sample. In Fig. 3, we
consider the problem of estimating the prevalence within
two categories of the population: one at a prevalence
p1 = 5% representing 20% of the total population, the
other being at a prevalence p2 = 0.5%; e.g. a prevalence
of the order of 5% is typically measured among exposed
health care workers [29].
Remark IV.1. Note that once a difference in prevalence is
noted from the epidemiological study of the general pop-
ulation, testing can be adapted to only consider "pure"
tests of these groups, and recover the total prevalence in
the general population through the quotas method. The
advantage of these adaptative settings is that the exis-
tence of a difference of prevalence in populations can be
tested before deployment of resources needed to measure
them specifically.
D. Group testing for regular monitoring in
communities
We now consider some applications of group testing
to the early detection of an epidemic outbreak within a
community, that is interconnected and reasonably closed
to the outside (work offices, schools, retirement homes,
detention centres). Our aim is to put in emphasis some
properties of the screening procedures that could be put
in place to detect an outbreak before it has the time to
spread. We first consider the impact of using multiple
7tests, and the size of the group tested to detect the exis-
tence of a contaminated individual in a group that is not
contaminated. Given budget of tests to be used per unit
time, we consider the effect of the regularity of tests in
preventing the epidemic outbreak
1. Optimization of the size of pools
Here we propose a working model to solve such opti-
mization. We consider a community of A individuals in
which we assume the presence of a unique contaminated
(patient 0) with a viral load C sufficiently large to be
detected, i.e. Y < dcens. According to the modelling in
Eq. (6), the probability to detect the patient 0 in k pools
of N individuals reads
P [+|ktests] = kNΦ(d(N)cens)/A, with kN ≤ A, (10)
where Φ(d(N)cens) = P(− log2(C) ≤ dcens − log2(N)).
We point out that, the viral load of the pre-
symptomatic patient 0 may depart from Eq. (8), which is
based on clinical data. For simplicity, we will consider the
case of a simplified log-normal distribution logN(µ0, σ0),
and study the effect of a modification of the parameter
µ0.
In Fig. 4, we represent the evolution of probability
to detect the patient 0 as function of the total number
of sampled individuals in a population of size A = 120.
We find that there exists an optimal pool size at a value
N = Nopt when µ0 is close to dcens, and the viral charge
in patient 0 is close to being undetectable, even in small
groups (top row). In this case, beyondN > Nopt, the risk
of false negatives in large pools overcomes the potential
benefit of testing larger portion of the community. How-
ever, when such high diagnostic sensibility is not needed,
the detection probability becomes a monotonic function
of the pool size N , indicating that larger pools are al-
ways beneficial. Moreover, if using multiple tests has an
important impact on the detection probability for small
dcens−µ0, the gain is marginal as soon as the viral charge
becomes large enough.
2. Optimization of the regularity of tests
We now consider a continuous-time steady-state ver-
sion of the problem described above. We imagine that a
community of A individuals is being monitored by being
regularly tested every τ units of time, and we seek the
impact of this parameter τ . Every τ units of time, k in-
dividuals are sampled at random in the population to be
tested as a pool. At a random date, which we choose to
be the time t = 0, the patient 0 in the population gets
contaminated, and immediately start infecting members
of its community at rate λ. Each newly infected individ-
ual then contributes to spreading the disease at the same
rate λ.
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Figure 4: Early detection probability of a single patient 0
individual with low viral load ν within a community of 120
as a function of the total sample size M = k × N , whereby
k is the total number of tests used, with (magenta solid line
with circles) k = 5 (dotted red line) k = 4, (green line with
squares) k = 3 (dashed orange line) k = 2 (solid blue line)
k = 1. At the onset of contagiosity, the viral charge of the
patient 0 within the community is quantified in terms of a log-
normal random variable logN(µ0, σ0) (describing the number
of amplification cycles needed to detect the viral charge in
a RT-qPCR machine) that is either (top) large with µ0 =
37 modelling a patient 0 with a very low viral concentration
(bottom) moderate µ0 = 30 modelling a patient 0 with a
moderate viral concentration; in both cases σ0 = 2.
Table II: Table with standard parameter values. We point out
that the (with std. the abrreviation of standard deviation).
Symbol Meaning Value
dcens Maximal cycle number 35.6
µi, σi, pi Viral load distribution fits Table IV
ρ PCR measurement error (std.) neglected
φ Delay before onset of symptoms 5 days
λ External contamination rate 0.5 days−1
r Asymptomatic probability 40%
τ Time interval between grouped tests 1−−10 days
A Total number in the community 120 or 1000
N Pool size 1–128
µ0 ; σ0 Viral load of patient 0 (mean, std.) Variable
We denote by r the proportion of asymptomatic indi-
viduals. Symptomatic individuals start showing signs of
being contaminated after a given number of days after in-
fection,denoted φ. The outbreak is detected either if one
of the screening tests finds a contaminated individual, or
if symptoms appear on an individual of the community.
We denote by Ts the time at which an individual in the
population shows symptoms and Td the detection time
of contaminated individuals within the community.
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Figure 5: Proportion of contaminated individual as a func-
tion of the number of sampled individuals using k = 1 tests
performed at τ -day intervals, with (solid red line) τ = 12,
(dashed orange line) τ = 6, (dark green solid line with square)
τ = 4 (light green solid line with circles) τ = 3 (cyan line with
squares) τ = 2 (solid blue line) τ = 1. Our model assumes
that the entire community will eventually be contaminated if
no test are performed. Here we consider a large community
composed of A = 1000 individuals.
In this model, the number of infected individuals at
date t, denoted by N(t), is distributed according to a
geometric random variable with parameter 1 − e−λt, as
expected for such Yule process [27]. In the absence of
screening tests, the average detection time is Ts, the time
at which first symptoms appear, with 〈Ts〉 = φ− log(1−
r)/λ. The average number of contaminated individuals
at that time then reads: 〈N(Ts)〉 = eλφ/(1− r). In com-
parison, based on Eq. (10), we find that the first screening
test after contamination will detect the outbreak with a
probability
P [+|ktests] = k(e
λτ − 1)(1− q)
λτA
. (11)
By the time of detection t = τ , a number of 〈N(τ)〉 =
(eλτ − 1)/λτ individuals has been contaminated.
In Fig. 5, we compare different screening scenarios for
a large community composed of A = 1000 individuals
(e.g. company). We vary the value of the screening time
interval τ while keeping fixed (1) the average number of
tests and (2) the number of tested individuals per unit
of time. Our simulation range from checks of k indi-
viduals every day to checking 12 × k individuals in 12
pools every 12 days. We compute the average number
of contaminated individuals 〈N(Td)〉 and compare it to
〈N(Ts)〉. We find that screening should be made as fre-
quent as possible. Screening for a larger subgroup always
improve the outcome, but the gain in each new sampling
decays after reaching around 40 individuals (see Fig. 5)
representing circa 4% of the population of A = 1000.
Conclusion
We considered the effect of sample dilution in RT-
qPCR grouped tests and we proposed a model to de-
scribe the risk of false negatives as a function of the pool
size. We presented a procedure to analyse experimen-
tal datasets in the viral charge of patients. Inspired by
the statistical results presented in [23], we expect the
statistics of the number of amplification cycles to be well
described as a mixture of 3 Gaussians censored at the
RT-qPCR sensibility limit. Our method could be used
to distinguish at least 3 sub-populations in the individ-
ual that were tested according to their viral charge. This
might be related to some medical criteria, which could be
for example the severity of the symptoms as suggested in
Ref. [26].
We point out that the viral load distribution that
we determine here based on the clinical sampling pre-
sented in [23] is likely to be biased compared to the vi-
ral load that would be measured within the population
that would be targeted in a group testing strategy, e.g.
asymptomatic individuals may have a different viral load
distribution than the one determined here.
We believe that group testing could provide the means
for regular and massive screenings required for the early
detection of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic individ-
uals, a particularly crucial task to succeed in the contain-
ment and potential eradication of the epidemic [8, 30, 31],
as well as for the measure and study of its prevalence.
Code accessibility Codes will be made available
upon request.
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Appendix A: Ideal tests
We present here some of the results obtained from the computations made in Sec. I, where we assumed that we
have a perfect test and used it to measure prevalence in the population. Note that with a perfect test, the question
of early detection of an outbreak in a community becomes much simpler : one just need to test everyone at regular
time intervals.
1. Number of tests and sample size as function of the population prevalence
We trace here, for various values of the prevalence, the number of tests and total number of samples needed to
archive a given precision for the confidence interval.
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Figure S1: Total number of tests and sampled individuals so that the width of the 95% confidence interval is smaller than 0.4%
as a function of the pool size N chosen for a perfect test.
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2. Bayesian inference
We are now interested in a Bayesian approach to the measure of prevalence. We started with an initial prior
distribution with density f0(p) = 6p(1− p)1{0≤p≤1} for the prevalence, and for each new test j we do the following:
1. take the the mean value pj−1 =
∫ 1
0 pfj−1(p)dp of the prior;
2. choose the size Nj of the pool of the jth test computed as
⌊
− c?log(1−pj−1)
⌋
(cf. Eq. (3));
3. choose Nj individuals at random and test them in a group:
• if the test is positive, then fj(p) = C+j (1− (1− p)Nj )fj−1(p);
• if the test is negative, then fj(p) = C−j (1− p)Njfj−1(p);
with C±j normalizing constants.
We trace below the result in blue of this experiment, the 95% credible interval being [aj , bj ], with aj being the 2.5%th
quantile of fj and bj its 97.5% quantile.
We simultaneously imagine the population as being composed of two sub-populations, one large subpopulation of
sparsely exposed individuals (prevalence 0.5%, representing 4/5th of the whole population), and a smaller subpopu-
lation of very exposed individuals (prevalence 5%). Simultaneously to the previously describe experiment, we track
for each test the number of individuals of each type of subpopulation that are selected (at the jth step, there are
Ber(Nj , 0.8) individuals of the first subpopulation). Using this additional piece of information, we update step after
step our estimation of the prevalences (p1, p2) in each of the two sub-populations, in the same way that we updated
the law of the prevalence in the complete population.
The results are traced below in orange and green curves. One can see that the width of the credibility intervals
of the sub-populations decay much slower than for the whole population. The reason is that the size of the groups
are optimized to measure as precisely as possible the mean value p. However, this shows that even with group
measurement, the more detailed information of the prevalence of a subpopulation of interest is not erased, and can be
recovered. One could for example construct an adaptative measurement of the prevalence, in which the first half of
the tests are made on the complete population, then analysed to detect sub-populations of interest, and in a second
time, the second half of the tests are made on "pure" groups selected among the detected sub-populations, with group
sizes chosen to identify their prevalence as precisely as possible.
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Figure S2: Bayesian estimation of the parameters of a mixed population, consisting of 80% individuals of type 1 with a
prevalence of 0.5% and 20% individuals of type 2 with a prevalence of 5%.
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Appendix B: Censored Gaussians
In this section, we present the estimation based on the simple mixing models and the complementary graphs of the
section III.
1. Naive method based on mixing models
By studying the shape of the histogram, we seem to see a mixture of three or more Gaussian distributions. To
estimate the parameters, we use the R package Rmixmod (see [32]) using the Expectation Maximisation algorithm
developed by [33] and we select the best model with the Bayesian Information Criterion (see [34]). As we simulate the
data, we did the procedure 100 times in order to limit the influence of the random part. Among these 100 simulations,
we obtain 95 times 3 clusters and 5 times 4 clusters. When there are 3 clusters, the estimation of the parameters is
very stable (standard deviation less than 0.03 for each) but there is a little more variability in the case of 4 clusters
in particular for the two classes with the largest averages (but the standard deviation does not exceed 0.25). We
represent on the Fig. S3 the histogram with an example of the estimated density for each configuration.
In each configuration, we observe that the first component (in red) has a small variance. However, as recalled by
[23], there is a censorship on the left which we can observe around s = 35.6: we observe that the last two classes of
the histogram are very small.
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Figure S3: Representation of the histogram with the densities estimated with 3 classes (on the left) and 4 classes (on the right):
the color lines (other than blue) represent the density of each component and the blue line the density of the mixture.
2. Censored mixture model
In this section, we present the complementary graphs of the section III.
Table III: Estimated parameters for the censored Gaussian mixture fit.
Model p1 µ1 σ1 pi1 p2 µ2 σ2 pi2 p3 µ3 σ3 pi3
Completely 20.13 3.60 0.33 29.41 3.02 0.54 34.81 1.31 0.13
Partially 0.21 20.14 3.60 0.32 0.19 29.35 2.96 0.53 0.20 34.78 1.32 0.14
Table IV: Estimated parameters for the censored Gaussian mixture fit in function as the threshold.
dcens µ1 σ1 pi1 µ2 σ2 pi2 µ3 σ3 pi3
35.6 20.13 3.60 0.33 29.41 3.02 0.54 34.81 1.31 0.13
34.4 20.13 3.61 0.35 29.35 2.99 0.57 34.21 1.03 0.08
33.2 19.97 3.56 0.03 29.40 3.14 0.59 33.21 1.16 0.48
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Figure S4: Boxplots of the estimations of µ (first row), σ (second row) and p (last row ; only for partially censored model) in
function of model (columns), the size n of sample (x-axis) and the value of the threshold s (color). The true value is symbolised
by the horizontal black line.
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Figure S5: Zoom on boxplots of the estimations of µ (first row), σ (second row) and p (last row ; only for partially censored
model) in function of model (columns), the size n of sample (x-axis) and the value of the threshold s (color). The true value
is symbolised by the horizontal black line.
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Figure S6: Representation of the density for the censored model with three components and a threshold at 35.6 (left), 34.4
(middle) and 33.2 (right): the dashed color lines represent the density of each component and the grey line the density of the
mixture.
